Battle of Guningtou

Battle of Kuningtou
Part of the Cross-Strait conflict
Today's Kinmen County, ROC (Taiwan) (red) off the coast of Mainland China (light grey), relative to the rest of Taiwan (dark gray, in inset). Greater Kinmen (Quemoy) is the largest red highlighted island.
Date October 25–27, 1949 Location Today's Jinning Township, Greater Kinmen Island (Quemoy), Kinmen County, Fujian Province (Fukien), Republic of China Result Nationalist victory
Belligerents
Republic of China	People's Republic of China
Commanders and leaders
Chiang Kai-shek Tang Enbo Hu Lien Hiroshi Nemoto	Mao Zedong Chen Yi Su Yu Ye Fei
Strength
Roughly 40,000 garrisoned troops mainly from the ROC 18th Army, 22nd Army, 12th Army (more reinforcements arrived after the battle however) Air support from ROC Air Force Maritime support from ROC Navy	19,000 infantry from PLA 29th Army Corps and the 244th, 246th, 251st, 253rd regiments from the PLA 28th Army Corps (Only 9,086 actually landed) 200 landing vessels (mostly confiscated fishing boats) Mainland artillery support
Casualties and losses
1,267 killed 1,982 wounded	3,873 killed 5,175 captured

The Battle of Kuningtou or Battle of Guningtou (Chinese: 古寧頭之役; pinyin: Gǔníngtóu zhī yì; Wade–Giles: Ku³-ning²-t’ou² chih¹ i⁴), also known as the Battle of Kinmen (金門戰役; Jīnmén Zhànyì), was fought over Kinmen in the Taiwan Strait during the Chinese Civil War in 1949. The failure of the Communists to take the island left it in the hands of the Kuomintang (Nationalists) and crushed their chances of taking Taiwan to destroy the Nationalists completely in the war.

Prelude

Following the establishment of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, the government of the Republic of China under Chiang Kai-shek began withdrawing its forces from mainland China to Taiwan. However, ROC garrisons remained stationed on the islands of Quemoy (Kinmen) and Matsu, located off the coast in Fujian Province. Commanders of the PRC People's Liberation Army (PLA) believed that Quemoy (Kinmen) and Matsu had to be taken before a final assault on Taiwan. The PLA planned to attack Kinmen from nearby Aotou (澳頭) (in Xindian, Xiamen), Dadeng (Tateng) and Lianhe (Lienho) (蓮河) (then part of Nan'an County, now also in Xindian) by launching a first attack with 9,000 troops to establish a beachhead, before landing a second force of roughly 10,000 on Greater Kinmen Island, expecting to take the entire island in three days from an ROC garrison not expected to be larger than two divisions. The Communists had incorrectly estimated that there were only 12,000 Nationalist soldiers on the entire island, and believed they consisted of green recruits and demoralized remnants of conscripted units that had survived defeats in central China – a miscalculation that would contribute to their calamitous defeat.

Expecting that a PLA attack was imminent, ROC commanders ordered the immediate construction of fortifications. By October, ROC troops had laid 7,455 land mines, and constructed roughly 200 earthen bunkers on the shores of Kinmen, as well as several anti-amphibious landing beach obstacles. The ROC garrison on Kinmen was also reinforced with armor (1st Battalion, 3rd Tank Regiment, which were veterans of Burma campaign, consisting of 22 M5A1 Stuart light tanks organized into two tank companies), battle-hardened infantry, and supplies from the 12th Army. In the opening hours of October 25, the PLA's armada (consisting of hundreds of wooden fishing boats) set sail for Kinmen. They intended to land near the village of Longkou on the narrowest part of the island. But due to the crudeness of their craft, choppy waters and winds, many of them were scattered and carried past Longkou and northwestwards toward the shore of Kuningtou instead.

In October 1949, the islands were home to approximately forty thousand residents. Despite its small size, Quemoy's strategic significance lay in its remarkably close proximity to the mainland. This geographical proximity positioned Quemoy as a critical outpost for controlling maritime access to Xiamen and its adjacent coastal areas, making it strategically vital for the Nationalist government's retreat to Taiwan.

People's Liberation Army

Order of Battle

• 3rd Field Army (Chinese: 第三野戰軍):
  -Commander and Political Commissar: Ch’en I (Chinese: 陳毅)
  -Deputy Commander：Su Yü (Chinese: 粟裕)
  • 10th Corp
    -Commander - Yeh Fei(Chinese: 葉飛)
    -Director of Political Department - Liu P’ei-shan (Chinese: 劉培善)
    • 28th Army
      -Commander - Chu Shao-ch’ing (Chinese: 朱紹清)
      -Deputy Commander and Main Planner of the Attack Plan - Hsiao Feng (Chinese: 蕭鋒)
      -Deputy Political Commissar - Lee Man-ts’un (Chinese: 李曼村)
    • 29th Army
      -Commander - Hu Ping-yün (Chinese: 胡炳雲)
      -Deputy Commander - Tuan Huan-ching (Chinese: 段煥競)
      -Deputy Political Commissar - Huang Huo-hsing (Chinese: 黃火星)

Preparations for the Campaign

Following rapid advances into Northern and Southern Fukien, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 10th Army Group had positioned seven armies (the 25th, 27th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 31st, and 32nd) along the Fujian front by September–October 1949. However, the PLA lacked experience in naval operations and had no air or naval cover for amphibious assaults. The 10th Army Group planned to seize Greater Kinmen using elements from the 28th and 29th Armies—seven regiments in total—under the command of the 28th Army. Simultaneously, the 31st Army was tasked with capturing Lesser Kinmen.

Nevertheless, since the crossing of the Yangtze River, the PLA’s Third Field Army had not encountered large-scale organised resistance from ROC forces. As a result, no detailed staff planning or training had been conducted for amphibious operations. Most coastal vessels had been destroyed by the Nationalists, and only a limited number of civilian boats had been requisitioned—sufficient to transport just one battalion at a time. Owing to this severe shortage, the plan to involve the 31st Army was cancelled, and it was decided that the 28th Army alone would launch the assault on both Greater and Lesser Kinmen.

PLA intelligence also proved unreliable. During the earlier battle for Greater and Tatan and Lesser Tatan, soldiers from the ROC 31st Regiment, 11th Division, 18th Army—part of the 12th Army Group—were captured. PLA 28th Army Deputy Commander Hsiao Feng personally interrogated the prisoners and reported his findings to higher command. However, senior leaders dismissed the intelligence, believing the defending forces were preparing to retreat. Even General Yeh Fei remarked, Impossible. Hu Lien’s army group is still in the Chaozhou–Shantou region and has not yet moved,” adding, “It seems there will be no major battles left on the mainland. Let the 28th Army just wrap things up.

Under repeated urging from the 10th Army Group, the 28th Army finally issued orders for the assault on Greater Kinmen on 18 October. On 21 October, PLA reconnaissance confirmed the arrival of the Nationalist 12th Army Group at Kinmen Bay, having begun maritime transport from Chaozhou and Shantou. By 23 October, the 118th Division had already landed on Greater Kinmen, with follow-on units en route.

Despite these developments, PLA command remained uncertain whether the Nationalists intended to reinforce Kinmen or withdraw to Taiwan. Consequently, no contingency measures were implemented. On 24 October, the 28th Army reported that the assault on Kinmen would commence that night. During a command meeting, General Yeh Fei inquired whether the 12th Army Group had arrived on Kinmen. Staff officers incorrectly replied that the force was still at sea. Based on this assessment, Yeh authorised the operation to begin before Nationalist reinforcements could arrive.

That evening, the PLA’s first echelon—comprising three regiments and over 9,000 troops from the 28th Army—was dispatched for the landing.

Attack Waves

• First Wave
  • 82nd Division, 244th Regiment of the 28th Army
  • 84th Division, 251st Regiment of the 28th Army
  • 85th Division, 253rd Regiment of the 29th Army
• Second Wave (only 10 platoons actually landed)
  • 82nd Division, 245th Regiment of the 28th Army
  • 82nd Division, 246th Regiment of the 28th Army (2 companies sent for reinforcement)
  • 87th Division, 259th Regiment of the 29th Army (2 companies sent for reinforcement)

Republic of China Armed Forces

Order of Battle

-Chief Executive of the Southeast Military and Political Office: Chen Cheng (Chinese: 陳誠)
-Deputy Chief Executive: Lo Cho-ying| (Chinese: 羅卓英)
-Acting Director of the Fuchow Pacification Office: Tang En-po (Chinese: 湯恩伯)

Republic of China Army

• 12th Army Corps (Chinese: 第12兵團)
  -Commander: Hu Lien (Chinese: 胡璉)
  -Deputy Commander: K’o Yüan-fen (Chinese: 柯遠芬)
  -Chief of Staff: Yang Wei-han (Chinese: 楊維翰)
  • Corps Headquarters (Chinese: 第18軍)
  • 18th Army:
    -Commander: Kao Kuei-yuan (Chinese: 高魁元)
    -Deputy Commanders Liu Ching-jung (Chinese: 劉景蓉), and, Hsiao Jui (Chinese: 蕭銳)
    • 11th Division:
      -Commander: Liu Ting-han (Chinese: 劉鼎漢)
      -Deputy Commander: Chai Lien-yün (Chinese: 翟連運)
      • 31st Regiment – Commander: Ch'en I-hui (Chinese: 陳以惠), stationed in eastern Kinmen
      • 32nd Regiment – Commander: Wang Ch'eng-hua (Chinese: 王誠華), stationed in eastern Kinmen
      • 33rd Regiment – Commander: Lu Chih-chia (Chinese: 陸志家), stationed on Lesser Kinmen
    • 118th Division (Chinese: 第118師) – Mobile strike force
      -Commander: Li Shu-lan (Chinese: 李樹蘭)
      • 352nd Regiment – Commander: Tang Chun-hsien (Chinese: 唐俊賢)
      • 353rd Regiment – Commander: Yang Shu-t'ien (Chinese: 楊書田)
      • 354th Regiment – Commander: Lin Shu-chiao (Chinese: 林書嶠)
  • 19th Army (Chinese: 第19軍)
    -Commander: Liu Yün-han (Chinese: 劉雲瀚)
    -Deputy Commander: Wu Ch'ui-k'un (Chinese: 吳垂昆)
    • 13th Division (Chinese: 第13師) – Commander: Wu Ch'ui-k'un (Chinese: 吳垂昆), did not engage in combat
      • 37th Regiment – stationed in eastern Kinmen
      • 38th Regiment – stationed in eastern Kinmen
      • 39th Regiment – stationed in Kinmen County seat, served as reserve force
    • 14th Division (Chinese: 第14師)
      -Commander: Lo Hsi-ch'ou (Chinese: 羅錫疇)
      -stationed in Kinmen County
      • 40th Regiment – Commander: Huang Yü-hsüan (Chinese: 黃煜軒)
        -did not engage in battle; landed post-conflict
      • 41st Regiment – Commander: Liao Hsien-hung (Chinese: 廖先鴻)
      • 42nd Regiment – Commander: Li Kuang-ch'ien (Chinese: 李光前)
    • 18th Division (Chinese: 第18師)
      -Commander: Yin Chun (Chinese: 尹俊)
      -stationed in Chinsha
      -missing 53rd Regiment
      • 52nd Regiment – Commander: Sun Chu-chün (Chinese: 孫竹筠)
      • 54th Regiment – Commander: Wen Li-hui (Chinese: 文立徽)
• 22nd Army Corps (Chinese: 第22兵團)

Commander: Li Liang-jung (Chinese: 李良榮)

• • Army Corps Headquarters
  • 25th Army (Chinese: 第25軍)
    -Commander: Shen Hsiang-k'uei (Chinese: 沈向奎)
    • 40th Division-Commander: Fan Lin (Chinese: 范麟)
    • 45th Division-Commander: Lao Sheng-huan (Chinese: 勞聲寰), stationed at Mt. Taiwu and Chinhu
    • 201st Division, Youth Army (Chinese: 青年軍第201師)
      -Commander: Cheng Kuo (Chinese: 鄭果)
      -Missing 603rd Regiment
      • 601st Regiment – Commander: Lei K'ai-hsüan (Chinese: 雷開瑄), stationed at Kuningtou and Chinning
      • 602nd Regiment – Commander: Fu I-jen (Chinese: 傅伊仁), stationed in western Kinmen and Kincheng
• Independent Units
  • 1st Battalion, 3rd Independent Tank Regiment (Chinese: 獨立戰車第三團第一營)
    -Battalion Commander: Ch'en Chen-wei (Chinese: 陳振威)
    -Missing 2nd Company
    • 1st Company – Commander: Hu K'e-hua (Chinese: 胡克華)
    • 3rd Company – Commander: Chou Ming-ch'in (Chinese: 周名琴), mobile strike unit
  • 7th Company, 3rd Independent Artillery Regiment (Chinese: 獨立砲兵第三團第七連)
  • 1st Company, 14th Independent Artillery Regiment (Chinese: 獨立砲兵第十四團第一連)
  • 3rd Battalion, 20th Independent Engineer Regiment (Chinese: 獨立工兵第二十團第三營)
• 5th Army (Chinese: 第5軍)
  -Commander: Li Yün-ch'eng (李運成)
  -On Lesser Kinmen
  -also known as Liehyü (Chinese: 烈嶼)
  -Did not engage in combat
  • 166th Division – Commander: Yeh Hui-hsi (Chinese: 葉會西)
  • 200th Division – Commander: Ma Hsin-ch'üan (Chinese: 麻心全)

Republic of China Air Force

Commander-in-Chief: Chou Chih-jou (Chinese: 周至柔)

• 1st Bomber Group (Chinese: 第一轟炸機大隊)
  • 1st Squadron - North American B-25J Mitchell
  • 3rd Squadron - North American B-25J Mitchell
  • 4th Squadron - North American B-25J Mitchell
• 3rd Pursuit Group (Chinese: 第三戰鬥機大隊)
  • 7th Squadron - North American P-51D/K Mustang
  • 8th Squadron - North American P-51D/K Mustang
• 6th Composite Group (Chinese: 第六混編大隊)
  • 5th Squadron - de Havilland DH.98 Mosquito
• 8th Bomber Group (Chinese: 第一轟炸機大隊)
  - Consolidated B-24M Liberator
• 10th Air Lift Group (Chinese: 第十運輸機大隊)
  - Douglas C-47B Skytrain
• 11th Pursuit Group (Chinese: 第十一戰鬥機大隊)
  - Republic P-47D/N Thunderbolt

Republic of China Navy

Commander-in-Chief: Kuei Yung-ch’ing (Chinese: 桂永清)

• 2nd Fleet
  - Fleet Commander: Li Yü-hsi (Chinese: 黎玉璽)
  • ROCS Tai Ping F-22 (Chinese: 太平艦)
  • ROCS Chung Yung LST-210 (Chinese: 中榮艦)
  • ROCS Lien-Cheng (Chinese: 聯錚艦)
  • ROCS Chu-Kuan (Chinese: 楚觀艦)
  • ROCS Nan-an (Chinese: 南安)
  • ROCS Huaiyin (Chinese: 淮陰)
  • ASW Boat No. 202 (Chinese: 驅潛二〇二)
  • ASW Boat No. 203 (Chinese: 驅潛二〇三)
  • Gunboat No. 15 (Chinese: 砲十五艇)
  • Gunboat No. 16 (Chinese: 砲十六艇)

Battle

25 October 1949

Battle Unfolds

At approximately 00:00 on October 25, a forward sentry officer from the 1st Battalion, 601st Regiment of the 201st Division (ROC Army) accidentally detonated a landmine. This incident led defenders stationed on the western peninsula of Kinmen to believe that a PLA assault was imminent. ROC defensive positions were rapidly manned, and searchlights—dubbed the "East-West Scarlet Beams"—were activated. These lights exposed an advancing detachment of the PLA 44th Regiment attempting a surprise landing, triggering immediate exchanges of gunfire.

By 00:30, three M5A1 Stuart tanks of the 3rd Tank Regiment’s 1st Battalion, 1st Company, stationed near Lung-k'ou, observed two red flares launched from the sea. They soon came under heavy fire from PLA wooden vessels and shore-mounted machine guns. The tank crews swiftly assumed combat positions and returned fire, thus commencing what would become known as the Battle of Kinmen.

Stuart M5A1 Tank "Miss Mary Lynn" repainted with the livery of the Tank No. 66, and the men dressed in light blue on the right of the picture is gunner Hsiung Chen-chiu, participating in the 65th Anniversary of the Battle of Kuningtou.

A notable early exchange involved M5A1 Stuart Tank No. 66, which had been immobilised with its turret facing inland. In a moment of instinct, the recruit gunner Hsiung Chen-chiu (Chinese: 熊震球) mistakenly loaded an armour-piercing round rather than a high-explosive shell. As gunner Hsiung pressed the pedal trigger, the projectile struck the mast of a PLA junk, setting its canvas ablaze and illuminating nearby targets. ROC defenders opened fire with coastal guns, including twelve 57 mm Ordnance QF 6-pounder anti-tank guns, M2 mortars, and four 75 mm M116 howitzers supplied by the United States. According to reported accounts, an ammunition ship was one of the first hit by ROC tank fire, resulting in a fire that burned neighboring landing craft.

Escalation and PLA Landings

By 01:30, over 300 wooden PLA landing boats surged forward in a major assault. Tank No. 66's full crew, including Platoon Leader Yang Chan (Chinese: 楊展), Sergeant T’ang Tsai-k’un (Chinese: 唐在坤), Assistant Driver Tseng Shao-lin (Chinese: 曾紹林), Technician Ou Hsiao-yün (Chinese: 歐曉雲), and Reservist Yao Pu-hsiung (Chinese: 姚步雄), were all actively engaged. At dawn, the PLA renewed its focus on Tank No. 66 and ROC's 602nd Regiment. Assistant Driver Tseng was killed during intense close-quarters fighting while manning an M1919 .30 calibre machine gun.

At 02:10, PLA artillery stationed at Ta-Hsiaopo (Chinese: 大小伯), Chiao-hsü (Chinese: 角嶼), and Ta-Hsiaoteng (Chinese: 大小嶝) commenced bombardment of ROC positions across Kuan-ao (Chinese: 官澳), Hsi-yüan (Chinese: 西園), Guanyin Pavilion Hill (Chinese: 觀音亭山) and Kuningtou (Chinese: 古寧頭). However, the 75 mm IJA Type 41 mountain guns and captured 105 mm M101 howitzers of the PLA artillery troops, proved insufficient in range and firepower to provide meaningful support to ground units.

PLA troops made landings along a 10-kilometre stretch from Lung-k'ou (Chinese: 壠口), Hou-sha (Chinese: 後沙) to Kuningtou (Chinese: 古寧頭). The 244th Regiment came ashore between Lan-ts'o (Chinese: 蘭厝) and Lung-k'ou, while the vanguard of the 251st Regiment reached Hu-wei (Chinese: 湖尾鄉). However, subsequent elements of the 251st were struck by artillery, resulting in heavy casualties—approximately one-third of their force.

Lacking unified command and operating under a doctrine of aggressive forward movement, PLA units pushed inland without consolidating their positions. According to captured PLA medic Chao Pao-hou (Chinese: 趙保厚), the PLA 244th Regiment suffered significant losses under ROC fire before they could entrench.

ROC Counterattack and Naval Movements

ROCS Chung Yung

At dawn, Commander Liu T’ien-hsiang (Chinese: 劉天祥) of the PLA 251st Regiment reported optimism to Deputy Commander Hsiao Feng (Chinese: 蕭鋒) of the PLA 28th Army, noting that ROC Youth Army units at Kuningtou (Chinese: 古寧頭) appeared weak and that numerous prisoners had been taken, some only wearing undergarments. PLA General Yeh Fei (Chinese: 葉飛), based on these reports, believed a PLA victory was imminent.

Simultaneously, ROC Navy vessels moved to intercept the PLA landing fleet. Among them were Minesweeper No. 202, gunboats ROCS Nan An and ROCS Huai Yin, and the tank landing ship ROCS Chung Yung. The latter, originally headed to Tinghai in Chekiang for illicit sugar trade, was reassigned to transport ROC's 19th Army. Due to delays and poor weather, ROCS Chung Yung remained near Kinmen and participated in the engagement using Bofors 40 mm and 20 mm autocannons against wooden boats.

At 04:30, the ROC 18th Army’s 118th Division (less the 352nd Regiment) joined with garrison forces to launch a three-pronged counterattack. The 14th Division, minus the 40th Regiment, advanced from Hou-p’u (Chinese: 後埔) under coordinated efforts by Generals Liu Yün-han (Chinese: 劉雲瀚) and Shen Hsiang-k’uei (Chinese: 沈向奎). Mortar units from the 40th Division provided fire support, while reserve tank platoons were held at Chiung-lin.

Air Superiority and Joint Operations

Republic of China Air Force North American P-51D Mustang fighters based in Taiwan, circa 1949. Aircraft of this type were used in the Battle of Kuningtou against Communist amphibious forces.

At 08:00, the ROCAF began sustained bombing and strafing operations against PLA forces and abandoned vessels. The 12th Army Group’s command staff landed in southern Kinmen by dusk aboard the MV Min Yü (Chinese: 民裕輪), where General Hu Lien awaited. However, unfamiliarity with the coastline and rough waters prevented immediate disembarkation.

Of the three PLA regiments that landed on day one, only one battalion on the western shore was not where intended. At daybreak, the PLA troops—now fully exposed—faced heavy, coordinated ROC attacks from air, land, and sea. Notably, the ROC Army’s 45th Division, formerly a security unit of the Chinese Nationalist Air Force during the 2nd Sino Japanese War, was outfitted with advanced air liaison systems. Commander Lao Sheng-huan (Chinese: 勞聲寰) successfully coordinated with 18 P-51 Mustang fighter aircraft from Taiwan, directing them to target PLA boats. Over 100 PLA landing craft were destroyed in what became a rare and effective tri-service operation during the Chinese Civil War.

Collapse of the PLA Landing Effort

As PLA vessels were caught in shallow waters due to low tide, they became easy targets for ROC air and naval forces. No second wave reinforcements ever made it ashore. Colonel Hsing Yung-sheng (Chinese: 邢永生) of the PLA 244th Regiment, although gravely wounded, continued to lead his unit until it was nearly annihilated by noon.

The PLA 253rd Regiment was pushed back from Kuan-yin Hill and Hu-wei Heights, and Colonel Liu T’ien-hsiang of the PLA 251st Regiment fought until 15:00, incurring roughly 1,000 casualties. Some surviving troops regrouped with the 253rd at Kuningtou. A detachment of the 251st Regiment held their ground through seven ROC assaults before retreating. The 253rd Regiment also resisted multiple counterattacks.

ROC Army Colonel Li Kuang-ch’ien (Chinese: 李光前) of the ROC 42nd Regiment, 14th Division, was killed while leading an assault on Lin-ts’u (Chinese: 林厝).

Realising the dire situation, PLA’s 10th Army Group attempted to send reinforcements, but could only gather enough transport for four companies. Due to ROC’s overwhelming control of the air and sea, additional reinforcements were deemed impossible.

26 October 1949

At approximately 03:00 on 26 October, an estimated 1,000 troops—comprising four companies from the PLA 246th Regiment and elements of the PLA 85th Division—attempted a second wave of landings at Hu-wei and Kuningtou to reinforce embattled PLA units already ashore. However, heavy winds and choppy seas dispersed the landing craft, and only ten platoons successfully made landfall. Their approach was compromised by frequent illumination flare drops from ROC C-47 transport aircraft throughout the night, significantly diminishing the PLA’s advantage in stealthy night operations.

The reinforcements were detected before reaching the shore and immediately came under ROC fire. Forced into disorganised mobile combat, they fought while withdrawing inland. At dawn, the surviving companies of the PLA 246th Regiment managed to break through ROC encirclement and linked up with PLA troops still holding out in the town of Kuningtou.

At 06:30, the ROC 118th Division launched a coordinated counteroffensive from the northern coastline at Pu-t’ou toward PLA positions around Lin-ts’u and Kuningtou. Urban fighting quickly erupted in the narrow streets and alleyways of Kuningtou, leading to intense house-to-house combat. Despite fierce resistance, ROC troops, supported by P-47 fighter-bombers and B-24 heavy bombers of the ROC Air Force, retook Lin-ts’u by midday and Nanshan (Chinese: 南山) by 15:00. Remaining PLA forces began retreating to the northern coastline but were unable to locate boats and instead attempted to escape into the mountainous southeast.

Meanwhile, at 10:00, General Hu Lien arrived at Shui-t’ou (Chinese: 水頭) pier between Greater and Lesser Kinmen aboard a tank landing ship. After meeting with senior commanders including Tang En-po and Lo Cho-ying, Hu proceeded to the Hu-nan Heights (Chinese: 湖南高地) to oversee deployment adjustments. Learning the gravity of the situation from General Kao Kuei-yuan (Chinese: 高魁元) —then leading combat on the front—Hu Lien assumed direct command of the ROC 118th and 25th Armies without delay. He personally coordinated with the commanders of the ROC 54th, 352nd, 353rd, and 354th Regiments, reinvigorating frontline morale. By nightfall, ROC forces had completed an encirclement of Kuningtou Village.

The ROC 118th Division’s commander, Major General Lee Shu-lan (Chinese: 李樹蘭), reorganised the assault by assigning the ROC 353rd Regiment to relieve the ROC 352nd Regiment. Supported by tanks, the ROC forces pushed further into Kuningtou. The battle continued into the night, culminating around 22:00 when PLA remnants attempted a breakout under the cover of darkness. Unable to locate evacuation vessels, they turned inland toward the mountainous terrain to the southeast.

27 October 1949

By the early morning of 27 October, surviving People's Liberation Army forces had exhausted their food and ammunition supplies. Over 1,300 troops, many of whom had landed the previous day as reinforcements, retreated to the beaches beneath the cliffs north of Kuningtou. At around midnight, they were discovered by Republic of China forces, who launched a concentrated four-hour assault. More than 400 PLA soldiers were killed, and the remaining 900 surrendered en masse by 10:00.

Despite the collapse of the main PLA force, additional reinforcements continued to arrive. At 03:00, a motor launch carrying around 30 men from the 3rd Company, 259th Regiment of the PLA, landed on the northern shore, but all were promptly captured. That morning, ROC forces had already secured Kuningtou village, but further PLA units—stranded from the previous night’s failed reinforcement attempt—were found hiding along the northern coast and also surrendered after being ordered to lay down arms.

At 09:30, Major General Li Shu-lan reported the complete success directly to General Hu Lien. Later that day, Southeast Military and Political Director Chen Cheng arrived at Kinmen by air, conducted an inspection of Kinmen and visited the front lines. While returning, his convoy encountered over 100 PLA troops who emerged from trenches and surrendered in orderly fashion.

By the afternoon, remaining PLA units near Shuang-ju Hill (Chinese: 雙乳山) were surrounded and forced to surrender. This engagement, occurring at approximately 16:00, marked the end of major combat operations on Kinmen.

28 October 1949

The battle officially concluded on 28 October as remaining PLA forces, having exhausted all resources, surrendered or were captured. Colonel Sun Yuxiu (Chinese: 孫玉秀) of the PLA 246th Regiment was wounded and committed suicide. Sporadic fighting continued briefly, but resistance had effectively ended. Colonel Xu Bo (Chinese: 徐博) of the PLA 253rd Regiment, who had fled into the mountains, was not discovered until January 1950. He was captured and later executed in Taiwan.

Aftermath

Battle of Guningtou memorial arch

The defeat at Guningtou marked a significant setback for the People's Liberation Army. In the aftermath, PLA General Yeh Fei submitted a written apology to Mao Tse-Tung, accepting responsibility for the failure and requesting punishment. Ye attributed the defeat to three main factors: the shortage of landing vessels, the inability to properly secure beachheads, and the absence of a unified command overseeing the three regiments in the initial landing wave. However, as Ye was one of Mao's most trusted and favoured generals, no disciplinary action was taken against him.

For the Republic of China (ROC) forces—accustomed to a series of defeats during the Chinese Civil War—the victory at Guningtou provided a crucial morale boost. Strategically, the battle halted the PLA’s momentum toward an invasion of Taiwan. Following the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, and the subsequent signing of the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty in 1954, the Communist Party’s plans for invading Taiwan were indefinitely postponed.

In the People’s Republic of China, the Battle of Guningtou received limited public attention for decades. It was not until the early 21st century that the battle began to receive wider acknowledgement in the mainland, when articles analysing the reasons for the defeat were published more openly. Military analysts cited several contributing factors: lack of experience in amphibious operations, inadequate landing craft, absence of armoured support, weak defensive capabilities, insufficient intelligence services, and a general lack of international recognition.

Additionally, the PLA had anticipated a swift victory within a single day of fighting and therefore failed to supply the first wave with sufficient ammunition, rations, and water. This logistical shortfall persisted, albeit to a lesser extent, during the second day of combat operations.

In Taiwan, the battle is regarded as a turning point and foundational event shaping the modern status quo between Taiwan and mainland China.

Legacy

In 1984, the soldiers who fought and fell during the battle were formally commemorated with the establishment of the Kuningtou Battle Museum. The M5A1 tanks used in the conflict were preserved and placed on display outside the museum as part of the memorial.

In Taiwan, the battle became popularly known as the "Great Victory at Kuningtou" (Chinese: 古寧頭大捷; pinyin: Gǔ níng tóu dàjié). Interpretations of the battle's significance have evolved over time. Government publications and academic studies frequently credited the outcome to Chiang Kai-shek’s strategic foresight and the Kuomintang’s military preparedness. While many accounts acknowledge tactical missteps by the PLA, recent perspectives also highlight the role of unexpected events—such as the accidental detonation of a landmine and the sudden reactivation of a stalled tank—as pivotal factors in the ROC's success.

Despite differing narratives, most analyses concur in viewing the battle as a testament to the importance of readiness, cohesion, and tactical flexibility in warfare.

The Bear of Kinmen

File:Bear of Kinmen at Kuningtou Battle Museum 20021010.jpg

ROC M5A1 tank with placard reading "The Bear of Kinmen"

The M5A1 light tanks deployed by ROC forces on Kinmen played a decisive role in countering the initial human wave attacks launched by PLA infantry during the landings. In several instances, ROC tank crews, having expended all available ammunition, used their vehicles as makeshift road rollers, crushing attacking PLA troops at close range.

The effectiveness and resilience demonstrated by these tanks led ROC troops to nickname the M5A1 the **"Bear of Kinmen"** (Chinese: 金門之熊). Among the most notable engagements occurred at Lungkou (Chinese: 壟口), where the PLA’s 244th Regiment came ashore and encountered three tanks—#64, #65, and #66—of the 1st Platoon, 3rd Company, 1st Battalion, ROC 3rd Tank Regiment. Notably, Tank #66 had broken down on the beach the previous evening during company exercises. The remaining two tanks were ordered to remain in place and provide protection until repairs could be completed.

See also

• Retreat of the government of the Republic of China to Taiwan
• Outline of the Chinese Civil War
• Outline of the military history of the People's Republic of China
• National Revolutionary Army
• History of the People's Liberation Army
• Kuningtou War Museum

References

Sources

• Liu (劉), Fengwu (鳳舞). "41". 《民國春秋》 [Spring and Autumn in the Republic] (in Chinese). Archived from the original on March 2, 2006. Retrieved March 5, 2006.

External links

• Battlefield Monuments at Kinmen National Park
• Interactive map of Kinmen from the Kinmen County Government